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Abstract 
According to Agenda 21, the UN’s action plan for sustainable development, “Governments and 
private sector organizations should promote more positive attitudes towards sustainable 
consumption through education, public awareness programmes and other means […]” (United 
Nations Environment Programme, 1992, sec. 4.3.). But some wonder whether the cultivation 
of frugal consumption habits in schools is compatible with basic liberal principles. This paper 
argues that, in societies like ours, liberal egalitarian theories of justice should permit and even 
advocate teaching frugality in educational institutions. Liberal egalitarianism expects 
educational institutions to equip children with the abilities and virtues needed to live well by 
their own judgment and in compliance with just institutions. The paper examines how frugality 
could be one of these virtues. First, frugality is conducive to better compliance with our 
distributive obligations towards the current poor and future generations. Second, frugality 
enables prospective adults to live well with their fair share of scarce resources, and even with 
less. Third, frugality increases autonomy and facilitates its exercise. The paper thus concludes 
that liberal egalitarian institutions should encourage schools to teach frugality. 
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According to Agenda 21, the UN’s action plan for sustainable development, 
“Governments and private sector organizations should promote more positive attitudes towards 
sustainable consumption through education, public awareness programmes and other means 
[…]” (United Nations Environment Programme, 1992: section 4.3.). One might wonder 
whether this demand is compatible with liberal principles. As Wissenburg puts it, “liberal 
democratic political systems have a prima facie duty not to interfere with the genesis of 
preference” (Wissenburg, 2013: 16). On the other hand, many liberal philosophers have argued 
that education should cultivate a repertoire of virtues to secure the required behaviours 
whenever institutions do not suffice (e.g. Callan, 1997; Galston, 1991; Kymlicka, 1997; Rawls, 
1993: 157). Their main focus has been political virtues such as civility, tolerance, fairness or 
solidarity. Recently liberal scholars have advocated the cultivation of environmental 
virtues(Bell, 2004; Ferkany and Whyte, 2013; Schinkel, 2009). But none of them discuss 
frugality, even though frugality is directly conducive to sustainability (Sandler, 2007: 48, 82). 
Van Parijs provides a short defence of frugality and discusses parental education in this 
perspective (Van Parijs, 2003). The aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive discussion 
of the following question: in societies like ours, is teaching frugality in schools compatible with 
liberal egalitarianism? 
I argue that, in societies like ours, liberal egalitarianism should permit and even 
encourage schools to teach frugality to children. Liberal egalitarianism requires institutions to 
secure individuals’ basic liberties and opportunities to live well by their own judgment. The 
task of educational institutions is to teach prospective citizens the skills, abilities and virtues 
one may need to live well in compliance with principles of justice within and across generations. 
This paper’s argument is that, in societies like ours, frugality is one of these virtues. Frugality 
operates as a virtue in three, interrelated, ways. First, frugality facilitates compliance with the 
duty to leave their fair share to others (including future generations). Second, frugality increases 
future adults’ chances of living well with scarce resources. Third, frugality facilitates the 
exercise of autonomy; certainly, autonomy is constitutive of the ability to live well by one’s 
own judgment. 
Three clarifications are in order before going further. 
First, by “societies like ours”, I mean a society characterized by an unjust distribution 
of resources, a lack of concern for our duties to future generations and a widespread consumerist 
ethos. A “consumerist ethos” describes an amalgam of desires, value orientations, conducts, 
habits and ways of living which dispose the agent to acquire goods in ever-greater quantities. 
Second, I define “frugality” as follows. Frugality is a combination of knowledge, value 
orientations, preferences, emotional susceptibility, practical skills and habits. This combination 
disposes the agent to behave frugally. A frugal agent is capable of living as well as a less frugal 
one with fewer material resources. This capacity is coupled with a stable disposition for little 
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consumption. Note that this definition of frugality does not involve a predefined threshold 
above which consumption would be non-frugal. Specifying this threshold would depend on two 
further considerations. First, according to liberal egalitarian theories of justice, consumption is 
excessive if it exceeds one’s fair share. So far the available evidence does not precisely 
determine above which level consumption exceeds our fair share. Second, liberals ought to 
respect individuals’ own appreciation of how much is too much. 
Third, even if I make the case that education should shape certain individual 
dispositions, I do not endorse the claim that individuals are the unique source of social and 
environmental problems. Two families of approaches provide competing accounts of the 
sources of environmental problems (Dobson, 2007). Structuralists argue that individual 
(mis)behaviours are driven by political, economic and social structures. According to 
structuralists, responding to environmental problems by educating individuals to change their 
consumption habits is pointless (Maniates, 2001). Voluntarists argue that individual choices 
and attitudes at least partly cause individuals to behave as they behave. A naïve voluntarist 
approach, which would claim that individual choices cause individual behaviours regardless of 
the context, is implausible. I take individual attitudes to be “part of the complex web of 
influences that causes us to behave one way rather than another” (Dobson, 2007: 277). 
Egalitarian justice requires institutional changes and behavioural changes. For this reason, 
teaching frugality involves the formation of individual habits; but it also involves raising 
students’ awareness of the social and economic factors that drive their consumption habits.  
The paper is structured as follows. The first section specifies under which conditions a 
liberal egalitarian theory of justice concludes to overconsumption. The second section shows 
how teaching frugality would be instrumental to secure our willingness to leave their fair share 
to the current poor and to future generations when institutions do not suffice. As it is easier for 
frugal individuals to live well within the constraints settled by distributive justice, the third 
section shows teaching frugality would also enable prospective adults to live well with their 
fair share or even with less. Hence teaching frugality to disadvantaged children in unjust 
societies is preferable too. The fourth section addresses the objection that frugality is not 
compatible with neutrality. It shows that what really matters from a liberal perspective is not 
neutrality, but autonomy. But teaching frugality can be done in an autonomy-compatible way. 
The fifth section argues that frugality even increases autonomy and facilitates its exercise. 
 
Global justice, intergenerational justice and overconsumption 
 
Since the publication of Rawls’s Theory of Justice in 1971, liberal egalitarians have 
extensively addressed the issue of how to distribute scarce resources within and across countries 
and generations.  
To get started, I shall sketch the main features of the liberal egalitarian account of justice 
this paper assumes. As most liberal egalitarians nowadays, I assume distributive justice 
concerns three realms: the domestic realm, the international (or global) realm and the 
intergenerational realm3. Liberal institutions ought to respect individual basic liberties. 
Institutions should distribute the resources and conditions so as to provide citizens with their 
                                                     
3 See (Barry, 1989; Wissenburg, 2013: 161–177). 
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fair share of opportunities to live well by their own judgment. Departures from an equal 
distributions of resources should be justified from the perspective of the most disadvantaged. 
Thus Rawls’s difference principle states that inequalities are just only if they maximize the 
lifetime prospects of those who occupy the least advantaged social position (Rawls, 2001: 42–
43; see also Van Parijs, 2003b, for the formulation). 
More and more liberal egalitarians tend to argue that similar principles ought to apply 
to the international realm (Beitz, 1979; Moellendorf, 2002). Even less demanding versions of 
international distributive justice4 – sufficientarianism, for instance – claim wealthier countries 
ought to provide some kind of assistance to others. 
In the intergenerational realm, liberal egalitarians have provided specific normative 
standards for sustainability. Rawls’s principle of just savings requires each generation to save 
enough material resources and conditions to maintain just institutions for its descendants 
(Rawls, 1999: §44, 2001: §49).  To prevent conflicts between inter- and intragenerational 
justice, some liberal egalitarians defend a principle of strict equivalence: once the material basis 
of just institutions is secured, each generation should transfer to the next one the equivalent of 
what it inherited, but no more, so as to avoid opportunity costs for the current poor (Gaspart 
and Gosseries, 2007; Gosseries, 2014). In a liberal spirit, intergenerational savings could be 
assessed in terms of future generations’ opportunities to live well by their own judgments, rather 
than in terms of needs or preferences (Barry, 1997). Hence we ought to preserve polyvalent 
resources and conditions so that future generations will be able to achieve the life plans they 
have reasons to value. 
Any somewhat demanding version of liberal egalitarian justice across countries and 
generations is likely to require significant departures from the current distribution. Institutions 
that honour egalitarian justice should not allow some to have access to the appropriation of the 
resources over which others have a legitimate claim. Consumption habits can be such that they 
involve the depletion of scarce resources and the degradation of the conditions current and 
future people may need to live well5. According to liberal egalitarianism, these consumption 
levels are excessive. Hence I will use the term “overconsumption” to describe justice-
threatening consumption levels. Institutions are unjust if they allow for overconsumption. By 
“institutions”, I refer to governmental agencies, legal rules, economic institutions (firms and 
markets) or conventional morality. Hence justice can require regulations and wealth transfers 
that might impose significant constraints on individual consumption. Now, are we consuming 
too much according to justice? 
 
The resources and conditions needed to secure present and future people’s liberties and 
opportunities include just institutions, means of production, manufactured goods, human 
capital, knowledge, cultural goods, natural resources and a decent environment. Natural 
resources and environmental goods are among the goods that are the most threatened by 
                                                     
4 For an overview of international distributive principles, see (Gilabert, 2010) 
5 Two other technical factors may alter the resources and conditions needed to secure liberties and 
prospects to live well, that is, inefficient production and population growth. Addressing these two other factors is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Let me just stress that technological solutions to decrease the impact of economic 
activity on ecological system without decreasing the economic output are subject to rebound effects (e.g. Figge et 
al., 2014). Population reduction policies are highly controversial and raise ethical issues of their own. 
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overconsumption, partly because they are underpriced. It is worrying because the services 
ecosystems provide to us are important for liberal egalitarian justice. They enable people to 
freely pursue the various life plans they value (Stevens, 2014). Worldwide ecosystems provide 
many valuable resources and conditions to present and future people such as food, fresh water, 
wood and fibre, fuel. Ecosystems regulate climate, floods and disease. For many populations in 
the world, ecosystems also have spiritual, recreational or aesthetic value (UN Foundation, 2005: 
28). 
Experts believe the capacity of ecosystems to provide services to humans is reaching 
critical levels (UN Foundation, 2005: 834). Increasing consumption and production is, with 
population growth, an important driver of climate change, nutrient pollution, land conversion 
and overexploitation of natural resources (UN Foundation, 2005: 831). Resource depletion will 
make future generations worse off in terms of productive potential, unless we compensate this 
depletion by investments in alternative technologies6 (Barry, 1983). With our current level of 
consumption, the peak of oil production will probably be reached before 2020(Sorrell et al., 
2010). However, evidence shows many nations in the world (especially the poorest ones) are 
unable to offset the depletion of natural resources by investments in human capital and 
technologies (Arrow et al., 2004). And resources depletion in these countries is to be attributed 
to high levels of consumption in other (often richer) countries, which import these resources 
(Arrow et al., 2004). 
Another instance of justice-threatening consumption is the direct and indirect 
consumption of fish products. Recent increases in demand for fish products are not only due to 
population growth. The average world per capita fish supply has almost doubled in the last 40 
years, shifting from 9.9 kg in the 1960st to 18.4 kg in 2009 (FAO, 2012). Technological 
advances, open accessibility of fisheries and government subsidies schemes have allowed the 
fishing industry to meet and to reinforce this demand (Pauly et al., 2002). As a result, “it is now 
well established that the capacity of the oceans to provide fish for food has declined 
substantially and in some regions is showing no sign of recovery.” (UN Foundation, 2005: Part 
1, 835). Overfishing has degraded coastal and marine ecosystem to the point that they will not 
be able to provide services in the near future any more. Recovery of the depleted stocks in the 
far future remains uncertain. From the perspective of intergenerational justice, this means that 
the future generations will be deprived from access to an important source of food. From the 
perspective of international justice, overfishing deprives fishers from poor countries (who 
cannot afford cutting edge fishing technologies) from access to employment and subsistence. 
High levels of consumption also threaten the conditions needed to secure peace, basic 
liberties as well as the least advantaged groups’ prospects to live well. These conditions are 
already threatened by climate change. Climate change is a factor of sea level rise, 
meteorological hazards, new diseases, the destruction of ecosystems and biodiversity. Climate 
change may favour conflicts (Nordås and Gleditsch, 2007). It is now widely accepted among 
                                                     
6 Although some technological changes could compensate for the future depletion of resources (Sagoff, 
1997; Solow, R.M., 1991), experts remind us that “the degree to which the provision of ecosystem services can be 
improved and pressure on ecosystem reduced by technologically generated alternatives is highly uncertain” (UN 
Foundation, 2005, p. Part 2, 455). Ecosystems are highly complex and technological substitution may have 
unintended undesirable consequences currently available models are not able to anticipate (e.g. Gunderson and 




experts that climate change is in good part due to human greenhouse gases emissions  (IPCC, 
2007). Human consumption of food products, fuels, manufactured goods, means of 
transportation, involves greenhouse gases emissions. To the extent that consumption levels are 
responsible for climate change and that climate change threatens the achievement of justice, 
these consumption levels are incompatible with liberal egalitarian principles. 
Overconsumption does not only affect the availability of environmental goods. 
Overconsumption threatens the long-term ability of the welfare state to provide services such 
as health care, education, social security and pensions. Consider health care. The sustainability 
of public health insurance depends on the willingness to contribute and on the health 
expenditures it covers. Tax payers are less likely to be willing to contribute if they prefer 
maintaining a high standard of living. Health expenditures are more likely to be higher if the 
insured are habituated to make an unnecessary use of health care services7. Overconsumption 
of health services is becoming an issue in many places (Emanuel and Fuchs, 2008). 
 
Teaching frugality to achieve distributive justice 
 
How should just institutions prevent overconsumption? At least three types of policy 
strategies can bring about changes in consumption behaviours: legal restrictions, economic 
incentives and education. 
Legal restrictions involve the use of penalties and sanctions to prevent 
overconsumption. Legal restriction only aim at changing behaviours without necessarily 
securing citizens’ commitments to the rationale behind them. Non-compliance is thus likely to 
occur without proper enforcement. But enforcement is costly (Batabyal, 1995). 
Economic incentives are “softer” than restrictions. They consist in taxes and subsidies 
to correct prices and generate the appropriate consumption behaviours. The longer the incentive 
lasts, the more likely it is to make the new behaviours habitual. But incentives are not meant to 
securing citizens’ commitment to the rationale behind them. Once the penalty is removed, or if 
it can be circumvented, people will return to their original behaviour (Dobson, 2007). 
Contrary to restrictions and incentives, education targets the attitudes which commit us 
to consuming less. The character trait that directly disposes to consume less is frugality. 
Consuming less is less effortful for frugal persons than for those who endorse materialistic 
value orientations8. Compliance with distributive constraints on consumption is thus less 
demanding for frugal people’s will. This is why teaching frugality is required when legal rules 
and economic institutions do not suffice to ensure that citizens do not overconsume. Frugality 
should thus be on the list of the virtues that support just institutions. 
 
Thus far I have argued that teaching frugality is instrumental to secure the behaviours 
desired for the realisation of distributive justice within and across generations. Now let me 
discuss two objections that target the effectiveness of this proposal. 
                                                     
7 Moreover, some forms of overconsumption are unhealthy or provoke health issues (overconsumption 
of food, using cars rather than biking or walking characterize unhealthy lifestyles; pollution might be responsible 
for many health issues, such as respiratory infections, cancers or fertility issues). 
8 Analyses of empirical evidence in psychology demonstrate that materialistic value orientations are 
related to weak environmental attitudes and behaviours (Hurst et al., 2013). 
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It might be objected that virtues such as frugality do not suffice to secure the desired 
behaviours in any situation. This is the situationist challenge to virtues (McTernan, 2014). This 
challenge relies on research in social psychology, which suggests that character traits (here, 
frugality) are unlikely to secure the desired pattern of behaviour (here, lowering one’s 
consumption) in all situations, and especially in those situations which are likely to induce the 
opposite behaviour (say, walking in a shopping mall). This “value-action gap” problem is 
documented by empirical evidence on environmental behaviours (Heberlein, 2012; Kollmuss 
and Agyeman, 2002). In response, let me emphasise that I take that the way frugality is being 
taught should take these problems into account9. That is, there are different ways to teach 
frugality. Some ways secure firmer dispositions to adopt frugal conducts in our societies than 
others. To mitigate the value-action gap problem, the way frugality is taught should be designed 
so as to ensure (whenever it is possible) that children acquire as firm and stable frugal 
dispositions as possible. Educators should choose the methods that are the most likely to enable 
children to overcome easily the gap between their frugal ideals and their actual life choices 
(some educational proposals are outlined in more details in the last section). 
 
Another objection would claim frugality strategies are hampered by consumption 
rebound effects (Alcott, 2008). The mechanic of rebound effects starts with (frugally educated) 
consumers reducing voluntarily their absolute level of consumption of non-renewable resources 
(say, fossil fuel). This creates a drop in demand, which lowers the price of fuel. The demand of 
marginal consumers rises. Marginal consumers have a low purchasing power and are initially 
frugal by necessity rather than by choice. The good news is that such transfer of purchasing 
power from the more affluent to the less ones is welcome from the perspective of global justice. 
The bad news is that the resulting intergenerational savings are ceteris paribus lower than the 
savings initially expected from our frugal education policy. The “rebound effect” refers to these 
lost savings. A rebound effect is of 20% when 20% of the initially expected savings resulting 
from frugal behaviours have been offset by the increased consumption of marginal consumers. 
This means that, as long as the rebound effect is lower than 100% , the frugality strategy remains 
effective to some degree. Now, two conditions are required for rebound effects to occur (Alcott, 
2008): 
1. There should be some left demand from marginal consumers 
2. There should be some left profit for suppliers. 
 
Two key variables are thus needed to assess rebound effects for the consumption of a 
resource R: the reaction of marginal consumers to the decrease of the price of R and the price 
elasticity of R. Given this, rebound effects will not happen in any circumstances. Firstly, 
marginal consumers will not necessarily adopt a classical economic behaviour. Vegetarian 
Hindus will not buy more of cheaper meat. Moreover, if it is true that desires for consumption 
actually reflect the desire to imitate those who are deemed “rich” or “successful” rather than 
the desire to enjoy more (Veblen, 1899: Chapter 4), then those who have less purchasing power 
might come to desire to live frugally like their models. Finally, frugal ideals are part of many 
                                                     
9 These details are not meant to constitute a comprehensive discussion of the situationist challenge. Such 
discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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cultures in the world. If the global society manages to preserve or restore existing frugal cultures 
all other the world, marginal consumers will behave frugally too. 
Secondly, it is not always the case that a reduction of demand leads to a decrease in 
prices. Another possible effect of frugality strategies is a “double-sufficiency effect”, that is, 
the voluntary limitation of consumption by some leads to an increase of prices and thus 
constrains others to limit their consumption too (Figge et al., 2014: 220). This happens when 
supplying larger quantities of goods involves decreasing marginal costs (when producers make 
economies of scale). Flying an empty plane involves little less costs than flying a full plane. If 
some potential passengers decide not to fly, then the marginal costs have to be shared by a 
smaller number of passengers and the price of the ticket increases, leading the other (non-frugal) 
passengers to renounce to fly. As the process goes by, some routes would be suspended. Here, 
the resulting savings are higher than the one expected from the frugality strategy. 
 
Teaching frugality to live well with scarce resources 
 
Liberal egalitarianism requires institutions to secure present and future generations’ 
opportunities to live well. Educational institutions are thus required to secure prospective 
adults’ sense of justice and the dispositions needed to secure compliance with justice principles. 
But justice also requires educators to ensure that prospective citizens will enjoy significant 
opportunities to live well by their own judgments (Brighouse, 1998). Opportunities to live well 
depend on the resources and goods one has access to, but also on being equipped with certain 
skills (Brighouse, 1998). Prospective adults need a repertoire of mental abilities and internal 
resources to live well. In the previous section, I have argued that liberal egalitarians should 
advocate teaching frugality in schools to facilitate compliance with distributive justice. I now 
examine whether teaching frugality could be advocated on the grounds that frugality is part of 
the mental equipment needed to live well. 
 
Frugality would threaten children’s prospects to live well if their well-being were to 
depend on how much they consume. But empirical evidence shows that, in the long-term, a 
higher rate of economic growth and the associated higher availability of material goods do not 
result in an increase in happiness (Easterlin et al., 2010). Empirical research in psychology even 
suggests individuals who have materialistic values enjoy lower levels of personal well-being 
and suffer greater distress than those who devote more time and energy to social relationships 
and self-realization (Cohen and Cohen, 1996; Kasser, 2003). Therefore, studies in happiness 
economics and in psychology tend to support the view that (at least above a threshold of vital 
needs), frugal consumption patterns should not result in a decrease in well-being. 
The kind of equipment (material or mental) one needs to live well depends to a fair 
extent on the circumstances one lives in. In a just order, the range of life plans one is allowed 
to pursue is restricted by the constraints settled by the egalitarian distribution of resources and 
advantages within and across generations. An egalitarian distribution does not allow anyone to 
enjoy an unlimited access to scarce resources. To live well, citizens must be able to be content 
with their fair share. Hence it does not come as a surprise that some liberal egalitarians view 
expensive preferences as a handicap or a misfortune (Cohen, 2004; Dworkin, 2000: 288). An 
expensive preference, in the technical sense, is not a desire for expensive goods when one is 
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equally satisfied with cheaper ones. An expensive preference results from the incapacity to 
reach the same level of satisfaction as others with the same resources. If this “handicap” results 
from education, and if expensive tastes worsen one’s opportunities to live well with one’s fair 
share, educators should make sure children do not develop expensive tastes. Teaching frugality, 
that is, the ability to be satisfied with less, is thus in the best interest of children. 
Frugal people are more likely to comply with justice principles because it requires less 
sacrifices from them. A parallel between teaching frugality and a system of compulsory taxation 
can be made here. Nagel argues that a system of compulsory taxation is better than an appeal 
to contribute to the eradication of poverty on a voluntary basis, because, even if it worked, the 
second system would make “excessive demands on the will” (Nagel, 1975). Excessive demands 
on the will diminish our well-being because they constrain us to regularly make difficult trade-
offs between the obligations of justice we acknowledge and the personal preferences we desire 
to satisfy. Therefore, teaching frugality secures prospective well-being in another, more subtle 
way. By securing our capacity to fulfil our obligations of justice, frugality allows citizens who 
have a developed sense of justice and who are aware of their obligations to enjoy the good of 
being able to live in accordance with their deep moral commitments, without feelings of shame 
and guilt and the associated loss of self-respect. 
 
At this point, one might object this is all very well, but most educators in the world will 
have to prepare children to live in an imperfectly just world (at best). Does the principle that 
educators ought to equip children with the skills needed to live well holds in that case? And, if 
it holds, does this principle still require teaching frugality? The answer to both questions has to 
be positive. Even if we cannot expect realising a just order in the near future, educators can still 
do something to improve the prospects of the worst-off. In unjust societies a minority of 
children does not need to be frugal. They can realistically expect to be able to consume whatever 
they might fancy. But most children, and the worst-offs in particular, will get much less than 
their fair share. Hence teaching frugality helps them. 
First, teaching children to become frugal is, in some way, giving them an income-
generating education. As Van Parijs puts it, frugally educated children will develop a 
“propensity to consume less than their income (and access to credit) will allow. In terms of the 
lifelong level of comfort one will be able to achieve, there is a world of difference between 
consuming 90% and 110% of one’s income at an early age.”(Van Parijs, 2003a). As required 
by the difference principle, frugality maximises the prospects attached to the worst social 
position, even when a satisfactorily just redistribution is not feasible. 
But frugality also renders the worst-off less vulnerable. Frugality increases bargaining 
power. A frugal person can afford refusing demeaning, hazardous and degrading jobs for some 
time. Frugal workers can undertake longer strikes to obtain better conditions. Frugality helps to 
deal well with financial complexity. Frugal consumers are less vulnerable to the exploitative 
practices of credit cards companies and other lenders, especially when bankruptcy law does not 
protect consumers well (Sullivan et al., 1999). In the absence of a reliable Welfare State, 
unconsidered expenses have worrying long-term effects on disadvantaged citizens’ access to 
property, education, health care and retirement and on the economic, social and educational 
prospects of their children. 
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Frugality also secures disadvantaged people’s well-being, self-respect and 
psychological health. Frugality limits frustrations. Being frugal reduces the risk of developing 
compulsive shopping addiction. Research shows compulsive shopping behaviours stimulate the 
dopamine reward system exactly like nicotine, cocaine or heroin (Hartston, 2012). Compulsive 
shopping addiction creates mental distress and suffering. It is a factor of poverty, family 
breakups, and loss of self-respect. The risks of developing shopping addiction are higher in an 
environment where sophisticated advertising techniques, the possibility to buy at any hour and 
easy access to credit strongly encourage ever-ending shopping. 
 
Frugality is indeed an asset for disadvantaged people in unjust societies. Now, consider 
two objections to this particular claim. 
First, one could be worried frugal children would be too “countercultural” to live happily 
in our societies. Living well certainly includes relationships with others (Brighouse, 2005b: 45). 
And sharing our peers’ tastes and values facilitates relationships. But, in societies characterised 
by a consumerist ethos, frugal children do not share most of their peers’ values and tastes. At 
best, no one will be interested in befriending the children or the adolescents who do not even 
have a cell phone. At worst, these children will be ostracized. 
This objection is valid only if teaching frugality in schools ends up being only sparingly 
effective. But we can be confident that public schools enjoy some authority to impose norms 
and values. Schools have been quite effective in promoting values such as religious tolerance, 
human rights or gender equality, which have become standards in our societies. Schools might 
have the power to enrol an entire society in frugality. Now, some adjustments are probably 
needed to prevent the unpalatable consequences of a frugal education policy that would only 
work in a “patchy” way. Teaching additional skills might help frugal children to cope with peer 
pressure. Children could learn the ability to code-switch (in the context of social interactions), 
that is, “the ability to adapt one’s behaviour as a response to a change in social context much 
like bilingual speakers switch language in response to a change in linguistic context” (Morton, 
2013). Frugal children could also learn some contrepied strategies (Van Parijs, 2003). 
Contrepied strategies consist in taking with assurance a stance opposite to what peers would 
expect them to take, being cool in being different. 
 
Second, a reader concerned with justice could be worried with the “doom and gloom” 
tone of my proposal. An objector could point out that the proposal amounts to caution injustices. 
It might even evoke the disturbing phenomenon of adaptive preferences (Nussbaum, 2001; Sen, 
1985). Adaptive preferences are unconsciously formed in response to deprivation and consist 
in dismissing options the agent would have preferred in more favourable circumstances (Elster, 
1982). But the similarity should not be exaggerated. Learning to be frugal is not the same 
process as adapting one’s preferences. The frugally educated person is not frugal because of 
some psychological process that occurred behind her back. She is aware of her reasons for 
preferring less, and she remains mentally capable of upgrading her expectations if she sees it 
fit. 
Be that as it may, the objector might point out that a liberal egalitarian perspective 
cannot consider that lowering disadvantaged people’s expectations is equivalent to deliver their 
fair share. Why? Because a society which teaches frugality to disadvantaged children in place 
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of (and not in addition to) giving them their fair share does not treat them as equals to other 
citizens (that is, the citizens who do not have to endure this situation). 
I would agree with the objector that the two solutions are not equivalent. But this does 
not invalidate the case for teaching frugality in unjust circumstances. First, if educators do not 
expect the realisation of a just order in the near future, the only way to secure their 
disadvantaged pupils’ long-term well-being is to teach them frugality. Secondly (except 
perhaps in appalling circumstances such as slavery), teaching frugality does not prevent 
educators from instilling in disadvantaged children a sense that they are being wronged. They 
would teach them the skills needed to be frugal, but they would not prepare them to enjoy the 
situation. Now, children might need more than frugality to live well while being aware that they 
are victims of injustices. Educators could help them by coupling the education to frugality with 
an education to fortitude10. Fortitude is the capacity to endure a painful situation without 
flinching (Scarre, 2010). Fortitude, writes Scarre, is valuable as a virtue because it is the 
“strength required for the preservation of the self” (Scarre, 2010: 86). Disadvantaged children 
for whom it is better to lower their expectations might need fortitude to be able to both recognize 
they are being wronged and still develop the motivation to struggle against these injustices. 
Ceteris paribus, teaching frugality to children will make them better off in the long run 
in just and in unjust societies because frugality enables one to achieve a given level of 
satisfaction with fewer resource. In just societies, being frugal makes one better off because it 
renders compliance with distributive justice less demanding for the will. In unjust societies, 
being frugal makes one less vulnerable to exploitative practices and to mental distress. Coupling 
education to frugality with the cultivation of other dispositions, such as fortitude or of the ability 
to code-switch, reinforces the contribution of frugality to children’s prospects for a good life in 
imperfectly just societies.  
 
 
Teaching frugality in liberal institutions: neutrality, pluralism and autonomy 
 
Teaching frugality in schools is a controversial proposal. So far many educational 
policies aiming to change consumption habits have triggered polemics. In Germany, the Green 
Party’s proposal to offer vegetarian meals at schools was followed by a dramatic fall in the polls 
(Connolly, 2013). In the United States, the Montana School Board opposed the screening of 
Annie Leonard’s documentary “The Story of Stuff” in classrooms (Kaufman, 2009). From a 
liberal perspective, these controversies raise an important issue. If the State actively promotes 
frugality, it acts in a non-neutral way. Is teaching frugality authorized by basic liberal 
principles? 
 
Many contemporary philosophers argue that neutrality is a distinctive feature of 
liberalism (Dworkin, 1978: 127; Larmore, 1987: 42–43; Rawls, 1993). A plausible version of 
the neutrality doctrine affirms public institutions should avoid intentionally promoting one 
controversial conception of the good life over others. This should apply to publicly run schools 
                                                     
10 I owe this idea to an anonymous reviewer. 
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too. If frugality embodies a controversial conception of the good life, one might wonder whether 
value-neutral liberalism is compatible with teaching frugality at schools.  
Now, does frugality really embody a controversial conception of the good life? A 
controversial conception of the good life involves a more or less structured comprehensive 
doctrine about what a good life is. Frugal habits have been and still are promoted by a plurality 
of otherwise divergent conceptions of the good life, such as Stoicism, Epicureanism, Buddhism, 
Christianity, Islam, voluntary simplicity, to name a few. But frugal behaviours do not 
presuppose by themselves one specific doctrine of the good life. Frugality may be valued 
independently of these doctrines. To highlight how it may be so, let us make an analogy between 
frugality and efficiency, that is, efficiency of means. Efficiency is the capacity to produce a 
given output with a limited amount of resources, time or energy. Efficient behaviours optimize 
the output/input ratio. Frugality is the capacity to achieve a given level of satisfaction with a 
low level of material consumption. Frugal behaviours optimize the satisfaction/consumption 
ratio. Both frugality and efficiency describe the ratio of an outcome to the resources involved 
to achieve this outcome. It seems thus possible to value them irrespective of the value of the 
outcome (a product or a level of satisfaction) they contribute to achieve. One could be tempted 
to infer from the analogy that, all things considered, frugality is actually a somehow neutral 
way of going about life. 
Yet this tentative conclusion must be qualified. For there is an important respect in 
which frugality and efficiency are dissimilar. Even if frugal behaviours can be valued 
independently of the conceptions of the good that encourage them, frugality as a stable 
disposition, that is, as a character trait, involves certain evaluative dispositions. For frugality 
to be a character trait, the agent needs to take certain kinds of ethical considerations to have 
more motivational force than others11. A frugal person cannot have materialistic value 
orientations. She cannot prioritize the ever-growing acquisition of material goods over other 
goals. Whereas efficient behaviours do not involve specific value orientations. Not only 
efficiency can be valued independently of the ethical value of ends, but even the efficient person 
herself can remain efficient while being indifferent to the ethical value of the ends she pursues12. 
Teaching frugality is not bringing about occasional frugal behaviours. As I have argued 
above, this would defeat the efficacy of this part of education. Teaching frugality is cultivating 
frugality as a stable disposition to behave frugally, that is, frugality as a character trait. But if 
frugality as a character trait affects the frugal agent’s values, then frugality is not a neutral way 
of going about life. That being said, frugality allows for more than one conception of the good 
life. Even if it is not neutral, frugality is compatible with moral pluralism. Frugally educated 
children remain free to form many conceptions of the good life which might be incompatible 
with each other. The only kinds of conceptions of the good life they are not (or less) encouraged 
to pursue are conceptions of the good life which are incompatible with frugal dispositions. 
 
Perhaps another strategy is needed to make the case for frugality within a value-neutral 
liberal framework. We might appeal to neutrality of justifications, perhaps the most plausible 
version of the neutrality doctrine, for this purpose. Neutrality of justification requires that public 
                                                     
11 My account of character relies on Sandler’s discussion of virtue (Sandler, 2007: 13). 
12 For this reason Setiya argues that general efficiency, the disposition to act to achieve efficiently ends, 
whatever these ends are, is a defect of character (Setiya, 2005). 
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policies should be justified independently of an appeal to the intrinsic superiority of a 
controversial conception of the good over others (Arneson, 2003; Larmore, 1987: 44; Rawls, 
1993: 190–195). Teaching frugality is compatible with liberal neutrality if the reason for 
teaching frugality does not appeal to a controversial conception of the good and thus is 
acceptable for reasonable citizens who otherwise disagree about the good. Liberalism can 
endorse education to frugality on the instrumental ground that actual consumptions patterns 
threaten just institutions. This is precisely what I have argued for in the previous sections. 
However, neutrality of justification does not only require philosophers to provide arguments 
for teaching frugality. It also requires reasonable citizens to agree with the argumentation 
offered. But, at least on a not too demanding account of reasonableness, we cannot exclude that 
reasonable citizens deny climate change and/or embrace consumerist values. Therefore, 
neutrality of justification is not likely to suffice to legitimise the cultivation of frugal 
dispositions in publicly run schools13. 
 
At this stage, it is important to emphasise that a liberal view on education does not have 
to be value-neutral. Major liberal thinkers have denied that liberalism is committed to the 
neutrality doctrine (Arneson, 2003; Galston, 1991; Raz, 1986: 107–162; Sher, 1997; Wall, 
2012). Liberal neutrality is generally justified on the ground that, by being neutral, public 
institutions express respect for adult citizens’ rational capacities. These rational capacities 
comprise the skills and abilities one needs to examine and revise one’s own conception of the 
good life. They are constitutive of autonomy. But children do not possess fully developed 
rational capacities yet. Hence the conceptions of the good they affirm, when they affirm one, is 
not the product of the exercise of their autonomy. Therefore, the State does not express 
disrespect towards them when it seeks to promote a conception of the good. Furthermore, the 
norm of respect for adult citizens’ rational capacities does not entail the State ought to be 
neutral. It rather requires the State to justify its support for controversial views such as frugality 
by presenting valid (not necessarily neutral) reasons to autonomous adult citizens for promoting 
these views (Wall, 2012). 
Expressing respect for adult citizens’ autonomy is thus the rationale underlying the 
neutrality principle. But this rationale has educational implications too. It requires teaching 
children autonomy-related skills and abilities. Because frugality is cultivated among children 
before they fully acquire these skills, their frugal value orientation is acquired in a non-
autonomous way. But this is not a problem so long as they are enabled to critically scrutinize 
their frugal value orientations once they reach adulthood. Even if at a first stage (childhood) 
frugal value orientations are acquired non-autonomously, at a second stage (adulthood) they 
can become autonomous if the agent subjects them to rational criticism and chooses to endorse 
them (or not). Frugal education is authorized provided that, in due course, children will be 
enabled to criticize frugal value orientations and to reject them if they deem it appropriate. 
Educators thus have the duty to explain and justify the reasons for their teaching frugality. 
Hence they have the duty to teach children the skills needed to subject these reasons to rational 
criticism. 
                                                     
 13Paying too much attention to neutrality in upbringing might also be problematic for children’s long-
term welfare. See (Fowler, 2010). 
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To conclude, if neutrality is not at issue there, children’s prospective autonomy is. But 
there are ways to teach frugality that are perfectly compatible with the development of critical 
thinking and other autonomy-related skills. Hence teaching frugality is permissible from a 
liberal perspective.  
 
  
Teaching frugality to increase and facilitate autonomy 
 
The preceding section has shown that teaching frugality is compatible with autonomy. 
My aim in this section is to strengthen my case for frugality and to show that frugality increases 
and facilitates the exercise of autonomy. For this purpose let us recall that most versions of 
liberalism require education to cultivate autonomy-related skills and abilities. 
Number of liberal political philosophers have argued that autonomy is necessary to 
ensure that citizens support just institutions (Callan, 1997; Gutmann, 1987). However, 
autonomy might exceed what the stability of just institutions requires (Brighouse, 1998: 729; 
Fowler, 2011). But there is another compelling reason for liberals to value autonomy: autonomy 
enhances our prospects to live well by our own judgment. Autonomy helps us to discern which 
way of life is good for us and to endorse the choice of pursuing this way of life rather than 
another. Autonomy is particularly suited to our modern societies, where we are supposed to 
choose many important aspects of our lives (our occupation, our relationships, our religious or 
ethical commitments…) and where moral pluralism and scientific change continuously 
challenge our previously held beliefs (Raz, 1986: 390–395). But being autonomous biases us 
towards certain choices rather than others (Callan, 2002). Is it a problem? Perhaps not, as the 
ways of life autonomy inclines us to choose might be better indeed (Callan, 2002). The ways 
of life autonomy inclines us to choose are, unsurprisingly, autonomous ways of lives. 
Autonomous ways of life are possibly better in the following sense: exercising autonomy, being 
self-governed makes us to relate to our life as our own and this is conducive to self-respect 
(Young, 1982). 
In the following discussion, I take autonomy to be the capacity and the disposition to 
reflect on one’s higher-order goals, to revise them if needed, and to act accordingly. Autonomy 
of course comes in degrees. But autonomy may also be conceived as a pure matter of rational 
capacities or also as a matter of character. I take autonomy to be a matter of capacity and 
character. If the capacity of autonomy is not supported by character, autonomy will not be 
effective in environments that are not by themselves conducive to its exercise (Callan, 2002). 
Autonomy as a capacity involves certain cognitive and reflective skills. Autonomy as a 
character also involves affective and emotional dispositions which enable the agent to exercise 
her autonomy in all sorts of circumstances (Callan, 2002). Could frugality be one of these 
dispositions? 
In what follows, I shall argue that teaching frugality facilitates autonomy in three ways. 
First (1), teaching frugality in consumerist cultures facilitates the critical assessment of options 
by exposing children and adolescents to genuinely alternative ways of thinking and living. 
Second (2), frugality increases the variety of the set of options one can choose from by 
diminishing the costs of reorienting one’s lifestyle. Third (3), frugality as a character trait 
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facilitates self-direction in consumer societies by helping agents to resist impulses and insistent 
solicitations to give way to immediate desires. 
 
1. Education for autonomy requires that children should learn to reflect critically on the 
respective value of the various ways of living they can pursue. Their reflection will be deeper 
and more enlightened if they can compare genuinely different alternatives and appreciate the 
reasons one can have to pursue a way of living that is radically different from the one they are 
immersed in. Schools can contribute to this by exposing children to values and lifestyles that 
differ from mainstream culture. Hence schools should have a “discontinuous ethos” (Brighouse, 
2005b). Teaching frugality is in line with the discontinuous ethos of schools. Frugally educated 
children are more likely to learn to think autonomously since they enjoy the real opportunity to 
reflect about ways of living that are alternative to the dominant consumerist ethos. 
 
2. The argument above strengthens the case for frugality, but it is not an argument for 
teaching frugality as such. It is an argument for schools to use their influence to expose children 
to the most varied set of options possible. The underlying rationale is that children have a “right 
to an open future” (Feinberg, 1980; Raz, 1986: 204). Because it is impossible to prevent 
children from being exposed to influences that will shape their habits and their future choices, 
the best thing to do is to multiply the influences they are exposed to. This argument is attractive, 
but I doubt it is relevant for consumption-related choices. Shaping consumption habits is not 
only a matter of brief exposure. It is a lengthy process of habits formation and of adhesion to 
certain value orientations. Education is unlikely to secure stable frugal dispositions if children 
are asked to behave frugally every other day, and to give way to consumerism the rest of the 
time. This implies that, with respect to consumption habits, educators have to choose between 
enrolling children in frugality or in materialism, so to say (the latter option might not require 
much effort, since private companies and advertising campaigns already take care of it). But 
being frugal and being materialistic impact differently on the accessibility of varied options. 
Being frugal renders more options accessible because being frugal increases one’s real 
opportunities to exit from a life plan to pursue another. A frugal person is more able to 
undertake important lifestyle changes because she is able to save resources in prevision of the 
future. For example, a person who wants to quit her present employment to go back to university 
will be more able to achieve this revision of her conception of the good if she has savings. 
Being non-frugal also increases the psychological costs of revising one’s conception of 
the good. Shifting from a frugal way of life to a more materialistic one involves less costs in 
terms of personal effort than the reverse shift. It is probably easier for children to revise their 
frugal habits once grown up and to increase their consumption level, than the reverse. It is more 
painful and frustrating to renounce to comfort than to get used with it. And the less costly (be 
it in terms of external resources or in terms of personal effort) a lifestyle change is, the more it 
enables one to exit and thus to secure an “open future” for her. 
Educators cannot know in advance which conception of the good children will come to 
value the most. To secure children’s autonomy, they should thus take into account the material 
and psychological costs of revising one’s conception of the good life. Ceteris paribus, they 
should make sure that these costs will be as low as possible. If the costs of revising one’s 
conception of the good are higher for materialist persons, educators are better to enrol children 
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in frugality14. Therefore, educators concerned with children’s access to an open future should 
seriously consider teaching children to be frugal. 
 
 3.  Finally, there is an additional, perhaps more compelling autonomy-based case for 
teaching children to be frugal. Frugality facilitates the exercise of autonomy and thus may be a 
component of the character an autonomous agent should have. 
To be able to direct her life and to effectively pursue the conception of the good she 
cherishes the most, an agent needs to relate to her future in a certain way. She must be fully 
aware that her life extends over time. She must be able to envisage to pursue her higher-order 
goals in the long-term and succeeds at it. This does not mean her preferences must be rigid. But 
this means changes in her preferences should be meaningfully related to the agent’s higher-
order goals, or that they should result from a thoughtful reorientation of her major 
commitments. Preference changes should not result from impulses or manipulation. 
Autonomous persons tend to have a coherent and fairly stable set of goals they achieve 
successfully, despite the external and internal obstacles they encounter. 
Paradoxically, even if it is better to be autonomous in our societies (as people must take 
themselves most of their major life decisions), social structures do not facilitate the exercise of 
autonomy. Therefore, educators should cultivate autonomy as a character and not as a 
motivationally ineffective capacity. Autonomy as a character enables agents to behave 
autonomously in autonomy-threatening circumstances. Autonomy involves the possession of 
specific character traits: a strong desire to form and pursue a conception of the good one 
endorses, the willingness to investigate the truth of the claims one encounters, the habit to 
prioritise one’s goals, a certain indifference to peer pressure or the ability to postpone short-
term gratifications. Do these character traits suffice to secure the exercise of autonomy in our 
societies? 
Engrained features of consumer societies threat autonomy (Schinkel et al., 2010). The 
media and advertising industry in consumer societies promote a consumerist ethos. The 
consumerist ethos consists in prioritizing the acquisition of material goods, regardless of the 
compatibility of an endless acquisition of material goods with the pursuit of the agent’s higher-
order goals. The consumerist ethos glorifies those who give way to impulses, instant 
gratifications and ephemeral euphoria rather than those who embrace self-control, long-term 
planning and the conscious prioritisation of their commitments (Schinkel et al., 2010: 281–
282). Those who live in consumer societies are surrounded by a culture that discourages them 
to pursue the conception of the good they had reasons of their own to choose. Furthermore, the 
consumer culture discourages the inhabitants of consumer societies to seriously reflect on life 
choices and to robustly adhere to any kind of coherent value orientation (Callan, 2002). Hence 
consumer societies might well wreck our very capacity to, first, develop a conception of the 
good and, second, pursue it successfully. 
There is another way in which consumer societies may affect autonomy. Consumer 
societies promote materialistic value orientations. Empirical evidence shows that materialistic 
value orientations are negatively correlated with intrinsically motivated experiences (Kasser, 
                                                     
14 Clayton (Clayton, 2006: 108) offers a general discussion of what taking into account the costs of 
revising one’s conception of the good implies for child-rearing. 
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2003: 7). Intrinsically motivated experiences occur in activities the agent considers worthy, 
interesting, fulfilling or gratifying by themselves, and not because of the advantages it brings 
about (such as money or praise). Intrinsically motivated experiences are constitutive of 
autonomous lives. An agent who chooses and pursues a life plan she has reasons of her own to 
value will interpret her activities and her experiences as being part of this life plan. Even if 
some of the activities she pursues are only meant to secure resources, these resources are used 
to pursue projects the agent deems intrinsically valuable. But people who endorse materialistic 
values tend to choose activities focused on external rewards (money and praise) rather than 
intrinsically motivated activities (Kasser, 2003: 77–80). They are more concerned with how 
they appear to others (Kasser, 2003: 80–81) and thus more emotionally dependent. They 
themselves feel pressure and coercion. They more often report feelings of shame, guilt and 
anxiety (Kasser, 2003: 82–85). These data show that materialistic values erase intrinsic 
motivations. But it is very hard to be autonomous if you are incapable of being intrinsically 
motivated by at least your most important life goals, if you are incapable of doing things for 
their own sake. 
Given these observations, I venture that autonomy can and should be facilitated by the 
cultivation of certain character traits that are not directly related to autonomy. Frugality is an 
autonomy-facilitating character trait, even though frugal persons can be non-autonomous. 
Relying on the observations Kasser and Schinkel make, we can anticipate the functional 
relationship between frugality and autonomy to work as follows. First, frugality increases the 
agent’s capacity to resist the pressures consumer societies put on autonomy. A frugal person 
does not spend time in shopping malls and on commercial websites. She thus exposes less 
herself to solicitations to consume and to give way to short-term rewards. When she happens to 
be exposed to advertising and peer pressure, she is less likely to give way to consumption. She 
knows that she can be satisfied without commercial objects she did not want before. Frugal 
value orientations secure the psychological resources needed to resist the incessant stimulation 
of desires characteristic of consumerist societies. Second, a frugal person positively values 
frugal ideals. She genuinely believes material consumption does not bring about flourishing. 
She values non-materialistic goods, such as friendship, family life, education and learning, art, 
sport, politics or religion. Many of the activities these goods involve are considered intrinsically 
rewarding. A frugal person is more likely to choose her occupation in reason of its intrinsic 
worth than in reason of monetary rewards. She attaches value to doing things for their own 
sake. In that sense, frugality facilitates autonomous ways of living. 
 
 
Conclusion: how to teach frugality 
 
 
 This article has defended the hypothesis that, in our societies, frugality is one of the 
virtues prospective citizens need to live well and autonomously in compliance with justice. 
Other things being equal, frugal citizens are more willing to leave their fair share to the world 
poor and to future generations. They are happy with their own limited fair share. Financial 
problems, psychological obstacles to preference change and the consumerist ethos do not 
hamper their capacity to form, revise and successfully pursue a conception of the good. 
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 Throughout the article I have made various remarks on how frugality should be taught 
to fulfil these purposes without violating basic liberal requirements for education. The way 
educators teach frugality should take social, political, economic and psychological factors into 
account so as to enable agents to behave frugally whenever they see it fit. In some contexts, 
educators should consider coupling teaching frugality with the cultivation of fortitude and code-
switching abilities. Perhaps more importantly, teaching frugality should be coupled with the 
inculcation of autonomy-related skills and the cultivation of an autonomous character. 
 To conclude, I shall translate these recommendations into a few concrete educational 
proposals. 
 First of all, including frugality in the curriculum will not be effective if commercial 
advertising and commercial objects are not banned from schools. A striking example is the case 
of Channel One Brighouse discusses (Brighouse, 2005b). Channel One gives pupils free access 
to television equipment under the condition that they watch 12 to 13 minutes of their 
programmes every day. But more subtle marketing practices occur in French schools and 
elsewhere (Rodhain, 2008). In general, advertising campaigns aimed at a young audience 
should be banned15(Curren, 2009: 50–51). Schools should consider banning commercial objects 
such as toys or cell phones children bring in schools. They might also impose school uniforms, 
if uniforms are successful in preventing children to develop too much interest for brand clothing 
and to feel pressure if their outfit is not fashionable. 
 By the same token, schools should avoid habituating children to luxuries. I have 
mentioned the German Greens’ proposal to introduce vegetarian meals in schools. Schools may 
also limit school supplies and school trips. Instead, they could develop frugal tastes, like tastes 
for reading library books, DIY, gardening, hiking or contemplating sunsets. Sharing books, 
school supplies and other things should be strongly encouraged. Schools should also offer a 
basic course in money, spending and saving to teach children how to budget, how to save and 
how to plan their finances in the long term, as Dutch schools already do (Schor, 1999: 157).  
 Children and adolescents should be taught the body of knowledge we have on the effects 
of consumption. History and geography courses might pay specific attention to past and present 
conflicts due to competition for scarce resources such as water or oil (Curren, 2009).  The 
curriculum should also include an introduction to economics and to environmental studies. 
Ethical reflection on global injustices and sustainability should be encouraged. 
 Kasser suggests parents should talk with their children about materialism (Kasser, 2003: 
106). His proposals may be adapted to civics classes. Pupils and students could have an 
interactive course on consumerism, peer pressure and the social and economic consequences of 
excessive indebtedness. Critical thinking courses could teach children and adolescents to watch 
advertisings with a critical eye, to identify the hidden messages they convey and the tricks they 
use to create wants. Children should learn how to spot and reconstruct the fallacies underlying 
commercial headlines. 
A pedagogical experiment is worth mentioning as a possible exercise of frugality. This 
is the “Not Buying It” educational project proposed by sociologists Liz Grauerholz and Anne 
Bubriski-McKenzie (Grauerholz and Bubriski-McKenzie, 2012). Note that the primary purpose 
                                                     
15 Children’s influence on family spending decisions has increased since the last thirty years. In 2002, 
American four to twelve years old children spent 30 billion dollars a year, and, in 2003, American twelve to 
nineteen spent no less than 112.5 billion dollars a year (Schor, 2005). 
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of this project was not to be a component of a whole programme designed to create frugal 
citizens. This project was part of an introductory course in sociology and was initially designed 
to raise students’ awareness about the connections between their personal consumption and 
larger social forces. But even if the primary purpose of the project was to enhance students’ 
sociological imagination, Grauerholz and Bubriski-McKenzie report some students undertook 
lifestyle changes afterwards (Grauerholz and Bubriski-McKenzie, 2012: 344). The project went 
as follows. Students read excerpts from Judith Levine’s book Not Buying It (Levine, 2007). 
Then they were proposed to refrain from buying things, except the “essentials”, for a given 
period (three to seven days). Students were asked to determine themselves what they deemed 
as “essential” and to justify it (“Indeed, this [was] one of the most illuminating parts of the 
assignment”, according to Grauerholz and Bubriski-McKenzie). Students were not graded on 
how successful they were in avoiding buying things, but on how seriously and thoughtfully they 
took the project and on the quality of the final paper. I venture that this project has features that 
would fit quite well with a frugal education programme. It involves practicing frugality, but 
also personal reflection on what is essential and what is not, and raises awareness of the social 
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